Wahhabism and Salafism: The Idea That United Its Enemies Mohammed H. Al Qahtani

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Wahhabism and Salafism: The Idea That United Its Enemies

Mohammed H. Al Qahtani

CEO @ Saudi Arabia Holding Co.

July 18, 2025

In my previous article, I promised you that I would return to the first moment of foundation: when the First Saudi State was born in 1744, not as a tribal emirate, but as an idea. An idea that combined the renewal of religion with the building of a state. And I said that the next article would reveal: why did it emerge? And why did it fall?

But during writing, I realized that talking about the state before talking about the idea it was built upon would be like discussing the branches before the roots.

Never before had such a number of contradictory people united in opposition to a man:

Zealous clerics from various sects, who accused him of heresy and violating orthodox beliefs.
Local leaders who feared that their thrones would be shaken.
The Ottoman Caliphate, which sent armies to suppress his call.
Foreign powers that considered his ideas a threat to the existing order.

And yet… he did not claim prophethood, nor did he establish a new school of thought, nor did he seek kingship.

All he did was call people to a single idea.
An idea that seemed sufficient to shift the balance.
And this article does not seek to defend him, nor to deify him, but only to understand him through his writings and his history, not through those who spoke about him.

Because, quite simply… he was the man whom the disagreeing parties united in enmity against.

And here we begin…

When religion became a means of authority, and reason disappeared behind rituals

Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, the internal image of the Islamic world was alarming. On the surface, there was still a “Caliphate” raising the banner of Islam and nominally controlling most of the Islamic centers. But reality was something else.

The Ottoman state, which had reached its peak in the sixteenth century, had entered a phase of political and administrative decline. It began losing its lands one after the other to the rising European powers. And it no longer governed most regions except through local agents, who granted it loyalty in exchange for being left to rule their peoples as they wished.

In the Arabian Peninsula, the situation was clearer than anywhere else: – The eastern coasts (today’s Gulf states) were under the control of the Banu ‘Uray‘ir family. – The Hijaz (including Mecca and Medina) was under the rule of the Sharif of Mecca. – The center of the peninsula was fragmented between small, conflicting emirates.

This tribal environment, in the absence of real educational or administrative institutions, made religion turn into closed local rituals, not into a system of monotheism, awareness, and life.

During that period, the Ottoman state had no cultural or service presence worth mentioning: no universities, no hospitals, no renaissance projects… only military forts to protect its influence, impose levies, and leave the societies to drown in their ignorance.

But the most dangerous of all was not poverty, but what accumulated on top of it of superstitions in the name of religion.

Intermediaries between man and his Lord became a widespread part of daily religious culture: – Whoever sought provision… asked it from the Sufi sheikh, not from God. – Whoever feared illness… hung an amulet or a necklace from a blessed grave. – Whoever wanted a child… made a vow at the shrine of one of the “saints.”

Thus… monotheism disappeared, and magic, talismans, and pleas for help took its place, under the cover of popular Sufism.

What is more astonishing: this deviation was not limited to the common people, but was officially adopted by the Ottoman state. For the “Caliphate” was not a protector of monotheism, but a sponsor of the Sufi orders, to the extent that the Caliph himself was affiliated with an order, and granted sheikhs medals and privileges.

And this was not merely a personal inclination, but part of the architecture of religious authority.

? It reached the point where parts of the Black Stone—the holiest corner of the Kaaba—were cut off and transferred to Istanbul, to be incorporated into the domes and mosques of the sultans of the Ottoman dynasty, in an attempt to make the political capital a spiritual center alternative to Mecca.

These pieces were placed in places such as: – Sultan Selim Mosque. – Sinan Pasha Mosque in Kasim Pasha. – The tomb of the architect Sinan. – Salahuddin Mosque in the Kadirga district. (Sources: official Turkish studies and documents preserved by the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs.)

The goal was not just decoration… but a symbolic message that “sacredness” was no longer exclusive to Mecca, and that Istanbul was the legitimate heir to religion, history, and glory.

But the irony is that all of this did not prevent the erosion of religious awareness from within, and people’s loss of their direct connection with God.

In that environment, when a person reads in the Qur’an: “وَإِذَا سَأَلَكَ عِبَادِي عَنِّي فَإِنِّي قَرِيبٌۖ أُجِيبُ دَعْوَةَ الدَّاعِ إِذَا دَعَانِ” (القرآن الكريم، البقرة: 186) meaning in the King Fahd Complex’s translation: “When My servants ask you concerning Me—indeed I am near. I respond to the invocation of the supplicant when he calls upon Me.“

Then sees people not asking God directly… but going to the tomb of a dead man, or to a stone, or to a Sufi circle— He must ask himself: what has happened to the religion?

❖ Here… a new call appeared. Simple on the surface, but it shook this ancient system:

“Return to the source. Worship God alone. Do not seek intercession through others. Do not elevate the words of any human above those of God and His Messenger. Do not sanctify customs, but test them against revelation.”

This call was not political on the surface. But it shook the deepest alliance in the Islamic world: the unspoken alliance between power, the Sufi orders, traditions, and superstition.

Its founder was not seeking kingship. He simply wanted to redefine the relationship between man and his Lord.

? And thus… the story of Muhammad ibn Abd al‑Wahhab began.

What was his call—and why did it terrify everyone?

His doctrine was not new. On the contrary… it was very old.

His call did not bring a fifth school of thought, did not establish a party, and did not invent a new jurisprudence. Rather, his call focused on removing what had accumulated upon the religion, and restoring monotheism (tawhid) as it was revealed in divine revelation.

He himself summarized his call in his own words: “We call people to worship Allah alone, to abandon shirk (polytheism), to follow the Sunnah of His Prophet, and to abandon religious innovations.”

But what appeared simple on the surface shook a deep structure of traditions and interests.

All his writings revolved around one central theme: “Do not raise the words of anyone above the words of Allah and His Messenger, even if he is an imam, a sheikh, or a saint.”

And his core verse was: “Say, ‘Indeed, my prayer, my rites of sacrifice, my living and my dying are for Allah, Lord of the worlds.’” (Qur’an, 6:162)

? Why did his call spread quickly despite the ferocity of the wars?

Because it returned religion to the people as it is—without intermediaries.

The call was clear, simple, and easy for the public to understand, because it relied on what they already had: the Qur’an and the Sunnah. It did not require a Sufi master, nor inherited rituals.

Rather, he told them: – Read the Qur’an. – Know your Lord. – Turn to Him directly, without any intermediary.

And he eliminated from religion all the layers imposed by history.

He did not say: Come under my banner. Rather, he said: Return to revelation.

? Who were his opponents—and why?

No reformist call faced opposition in such varied forms as the call of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. For the man who clearly proclaimed monotheism and the end of intermediaries found himself confronting contradictory factions:

His doctrinal opponents: The Shi‘a and the Sufis saw in him a direct threat. Some of them had built their status on miracles, shrine visits, and innovations. If you stripped religion of that, their status collapsed. Even some Sunni scholars accused him of extremism, because they feared the rug would be pulled out from under them.
His economic opponents: Those who profited from vows, pilgrimage seasons, or shrines feared his call. Those who sold “blessing” did not want someone reminding people of pure monotheism. Even the ruler of al-Ahsa sent a warning to the Emir of al-‘Uyaynah: Kill the Sheikh or the tribute will be cut off.
His political opponents: Local emirs feared the religious unification of Najd under a central banner. The Sharif of Mecca saw in it a direct threat to his religious guardianship. The Ottoman Empire accused him of rebellion and sent Muhammad Ali Pasha to eliminate Dir‘iyyah.
His Colonial Opponents: When Purity Alarmed Them… and They Feared Contagion Although Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab had no contact during his life with any Western power, the echo of his call quickly reached the corridors of British political circles.

In British archival documents—specifically within the records of the colonial administration of India—there are early references to “the Najdi Sheikh” who “unified the tribes” and “reshaped Islam from within,” at a time when Britain ruled over Muslim-majority India and feared any Islamic movement that might unify people around a purified creed.

In a report dating back to 1806, issued by the British East India Company, there is a warning about the danger posed by “the Wahhabi doctrine,” and concern over its growing influence among Muslims in India and the Hijaz. The report stated:

“This doctrine [Wahhabism] aims to cleanse Islam of all forms of polytheism and denies intermediation between people and their Lord. This may lead to a religious insurrection that threatens stability in our colonies.”

In a telegram from the British governor in Bombay in 1810, it was written: “We must monitor this ideological expansion closely, for its experience may be replicated in the mosques of India… under the guise of religious renewal.”

British historian H. St. John Philby noted in his memoirs: “Britain faced in Arabia a different kind of adversary; one who was not seeking power or wealth, but the return of religion to its essence… and this type of adversary cannot be bought.”

❖For this reason… the term “Wahhabi” in later British correspondence became a ready-made accusation against any Muslim reformer who stepped out of line.

Even in Algeria and Syria, France used the term “Wahhabi” against anyone who called for monotheism or rejected religious innovations, in an attempt to isolate them from the people.

❖ And thus, it becomes clear that the Sheikh’s opponents were not only sects or local leaders, but even colonial powers—those who had not yet entered the Arabian Peninsula, yet already understood that there was a different idea emerging… one that threatened their future.

❖ In fact, there were scholars in the Islamic world who called for the same message, but they found no supporter. While Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab found a state that carried the idea and spread it—and this is what alarmed all of Europe.

? Was his call for power—or for God?

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was the chief official in the state responsible for judiciary, fatwas, and zakat distribution. But when Imam ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud assumed power after his father, and he himself was a religious scholar who had studied and understood Islamic law, the Sheikh handed over all his responsibilities to him.

❖ Because he wanted a system with one head, without religious leadership factions or parties. And in his book Kitab al-Tawhid, when interpreting the verse: “Say, This is my way: I invite to Allah with insight—I and those who follow me.” (Qur’an, 12:108) He said: “He calls to Allah—not to himself, nor to his group.”

And for that reason… he became a natural adversary to all political Islamic movements that turn religion into a means for power or party control.

? Why Did His Call Spread So Quickly—and Why Has Its Impact Lasted Until Today?

Many reformist movements were extinguished at birth. But the call of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab… succeeded. In fact, it spread in a short time, despite the intensity of opposition, the strength of the attacks, and the multiplicity of hostile parties.

So what was the secret?

❖ The answer is simple… but its effect is profound: because it brought religion back to the people. It returned it to its original source… the Qur’an and the Sunnah. It made religion understandable to the public, not the monopoly of the elite. It made the individual turn his heart to Allah alone, needing no sheikh to relay the message, no intermediary to draw him near.

It required no rituals. No litanies. No festivals, shrines, or mystical halos. Rather, it simply told people: “Read the Qur’an. Understand it. Apply it. Turn to Allah alone. There is no intermediary between you and Him. Live your religion clearly. And live your worldly life with professionalism… not with Sufism.”

This simplicity at its core was a revolution against historical layers of religiosity. A religiosity that had come to bind people with rituals for which Allah sent down no authority, and to grant power to intermediaries, not to revelation.

And from here… his call became easy to grasp, compelling in argument, and close to the hearts of people—especially in societies exhausted by tribal burdens, Sufi loyalties, and levies unsupported by Islamic law.

Why Has This Call Remained Alive at the Heart of the Saudi State to This Day?

More than two and a half centuries later… this call remains the heart of the Saudi project.

It was not buried. It was not excluded. It was not diminished. Instead, it continued to shape public consciousness, define the basis of governance, and frame the relationship between ruler and ruled. Why? Because—quite simply—it is not a personal project, but a foundational one.

❖ It was the very base upon which the First Saudi State was born, then the second, then the third.

And when many Westerners ask me about the secret, I tell them: read my article: Theocracy or Secular State? So What Is Saudi Arabia? You will find that Saudi Arabia is not a theocratic state in the priestly sense, nor a secular state divorced from religion, but a state built upon renewing the very concept of religion. A state that unites rather than divides, that simplifies religion rather than monopolizing it, that separates creed from party power—but links religious values to state institutions.

❖ The call of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was different in its aim.

It did not seek to create a “Party of God,” nor to establish a “Caliphate,” nor to revive “political Islam” in its activist form. Rather, it was a call to purify religion from superstition—not to weaponize it for political struggle. And for that reason, it clashed early on with all partisan Islamic political movements.

Was It Truly Successful—and Can It Still Inspire Today?

Its success is not measured by the number of supporters, but by its resilience through the storms of time. Its success lies in the fact that everyone who fought it… failed. From the Ottoman Empire, to Muhammad Ali Pasha, to British colonialism, to the later movements of political Islam.

And its greatest success: it built a state. A state that still exists, that continues, that renews itself, that secures its people, and that is becoming one of the strongest political and strategic models of the twenty-first century.

Why Was His Call Not a “Political Movement”?

When speaking about Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, many who read history through the lens of the present project onto him the concepts of contemporary Islamic movements. They imagine him to be the founder of a party, an aspirant to power, or even the initiator of a “religious state” similar to models known in the twentieth century.

But the reality is far removed from that.

His mission was the very opposite of everything known today as “political Islam.”

He did not aspire to build a party, nor to empower a faction, nor to use religion as a political lever.

Rather, his call was based on stripping religion from people’s monopolization of it, and rescuing it from ritualistic domination and the organizational superstitions imposed by orders and ideological movements.

❖ And for this reason, the first to clash with his call were the political movements cloaked in religion—because they saw his clarity as a threat to their narrative.

He did not believe in the sanctity of any group, nor in the legitimacy of any party, nor in anyone’s right to monopolize the understanding of religion.

His message was simple and profound:

Return to the Qur’an. Do not follow me… follow the truth. Do not make me a mediator… nor anyone else.

❖ And for this reason, his call continued after his death, because its continuity did not depend on a person, nor on an organization, but on understanding, on reference to revelation, and on a community that reads.

While most other movements collapsed—because they were built on human ambitions, emotional zeal, or on exploiting religion instead of serving it.

? The fundamental difference is that his call came to serve revelation… not to use it.

And that is what made the difference, left the lasting impact, and produced a state that still stands today, constantly renewing itself, and reinterpreting religion—not according to party agendas, but according to purpose, truth, and benefit for people.

❖ And here… we can begin, in the next article, to talk about the First Saudi State:

How did it emerge? And why did it attract peoples from outside of Najd? And why was it not just the seed of Saudi Arabia—but also of other states under its banner? And did it really fall only at the hands of the Ottomans? Or were the British more cunning than they appear in the history books?

These are the questions… we will answer in the next article.